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Abstract. In this paper, we present our initial design and implementa-
tion of a declarative network verifier (DNV). DNV utilizes theorem prov-
ing, a well established verification technique where logic-based axioms
that automatically capture network semantics are generated, and a user-
driven proof process is used to establish network correctness properties.
DNV takes as input declarative networking specifications written in the
Network Datalog (NDlog) query language, and maps that automatically
into logical axioms that can be directly used in existing theorem provers
to validate protocol correctness. DNV is a significant improvement com-
pared to existing use case of theorem proving which typically require
several man-months to construct the system specifications. Moreover,
NDlog, a high-level specification, whose semantics are precisely compiled
into DNV without loss, can be directly executed as implementations,
hence bridging specifications, verification, and implementation. To vali-
date the use of DNV, we present case studies using DNV in conjunction
with the PVS theorem prover to verify routing protocols, including even-
tual properties of protocols in dynamic settings.
Keywords: declarative networking, network protocol verification, domain-
specific languages, theorem proving
1 Introduction
In recent years, we have witnessed a proliferation of new overlay networks [24]
that use the existing Internet to enable deployable network evolution and intro-
duce new services. Concurrently, as sophisticated, bandwidth-intensive, and even
mission-critical services are being deployed over heterogeneous network infras-
tructure, there is increased demand for new network routing protocols that can
flexibly adapt to a wide range of variability in network connectivity and data
traffic patterns. This has cummulated into recent efforts at clean-slate efforts
aimed at redesigning the Internet.
Given the proliferation of new architectures and protocols, there is a growing
consensus on the need for formal software tools and programming frameworks
that can facilitate the design, implementation, and verification of new protocols.
This has lead to several recent proposals broadly classified as: (1) algebraic and
logic frameworks [11, 9] that enable protocol correctness in the design phase;
(2) testing platforms [16, 27] that provide mechanisms for runtime verification
and distributed replay, and (3) programming toolkits [8, 14] that enable network
protocols to be specified, implemented, and model-checked.
In this paper, we present our initial design and implementation of a declara-
tive network verifier (DNV). Our work is a significant step towards bridging net-
work specifications, protocol verification, and implementation within a common
language and system. DNV achieves this unified capability via the use of declara-
tive networking [20, 19, 18], a declarative domain-specific approach for specifying
and implementing network protocols, and theorem proving, a well established
verification technique based on logical reasoning.
In declarative networking, network protocols are specified using a declarative
logic-based query language called Network Datalog (NDlog). In prior work, it has
been shown that traditional routing protocols can be specified in a few lines of
declarative code [20], and complex protocols such as Chord DHT [31] in orders
of magnitude less code [19] compared to traditional imperative implementations.
This compact and high-level specifications enables rapid prototype development,
ease of customization, optimizability, and the potentiality for protocol verifica-
tion. When executed, these declarative networks perform efficiently relative to
imperative implementations, as demonstrated by the P2 declarative networking
system [1].
Recent significant advances in model checking of network protocol imple-
mentations include MaceMC [13] and CMC [7]. Compared to these proposals,
DNV has the advantage that it achieves complete verification for networks of
arbitrary size, a long-standing challenge in any practical network verification
system. Incomplete verification is a common limitation in MaceMC and CMC
due to the the state-explosion problem, particularly when used to verify large
networks with complex protocol behavior. In addition, since DNV directly ver-
ifies declarative networking specifications, an explicit model extraction step via
execution exploration is not required.
This paper makes the following two contributions:
• First, we propose DNV, a declarative network verifier that leverages declara-
tive networking’s connection to logic programming to automatically compile
high-level NDlog program into formal specifications as axioms without seman-
tics loss, which can be further used in a theorem prover to validate protocols.
A semi-automated proof guided by the user is then carried out and mechan-
ically checked in a general-purpose theorem prover to establish the protocol
correctness properties. High-level NDlog programs that have been verified in
DNV can be directly executed as implementations, hence bridging specifica-
tions and implementations within a unified declarative framework.
• Second, we demonstrate that DNV enables the verification of network proto-
cols in dynamic settings, where protocols continuously update network state
based on incoming network events. DNV achieves this via its use of declarative
networking which incorporates the notion of periodic soft-state [26] mainte-
nance of network state into its query language and semantics. Soft state is
central and critical in networking implementations because in a very simple
manner it provides eventually correct semantics in the face of reordered mes-
sages, node disconnection, and other unpredictable occurrences.
DNV aims to provide a practical solution towards network protocol veri-
fication, one that achieves a unifying framework that combines specifications,
verification, and implementation. Our work is a significant improvement over
existing usage of theorem proving [12, 10] which typically require several man-
months to develop the system specifications, a step that DNV reduces to a few
hours through the use of declarative networking. To our best knowledge, DNV
is also one of the first attempts at using theorem proving to verify eventual
semantics of protocols in dynamic settings.
2 Background: Declarative Networking
In this section, we will provide a brief overview of declarative networking. Inter-
ested readers are referred to references [20, 19, 18, 17] for more details.
2.1 Datalog Language
Declarative networks are specified using Network Datalog (NDlog), a distributed
logic-based recursive query language first introduced in the database community
for querying network graphs. NDlog is primarily a distributed variant of Dat-
alog. We first provide a short review of Datalog, following the conventions in
Ramakrishnan and Ullman’s survey [25]. A Datalog program consists of a set of
declarative rules. Each rule has the form p :- q1, q2, ..., qn., which can be
read informally as “q1 and q2 and ... and qn implies p”. Here, p is the head of
the rule, and q1, q2,...,qn is a list of literals that constitutes the body of the rule.
Literals are either predicates with attributes (which are bound to variables or
constants by the query), or boolean expressions that involve function symbols
(including arithmetic) applied to attributes. In Datalog, rule predicates can be
defined with other predicates in a cyclic fashion to express recursion. The or-
der in which the rules are presented in a program is semantically immaterial;
likewise, the order predicates appear in a rule is not semantically meaningful.
Commas are interpreted as logical conjunctions (AND). The names of predicates,
function symbols, and variable names begin with an upper letter, while constants
names begin with an lowercase letter. An optional Query rule specifies the output
of interest (i.e. result tuples).
2.2 Path-vector Protocol
We present an example NDlog program that implements the path-vector proto-
col [23], a standard textbook route protocol used for computing paths between
any two nodes in the network.
p1 path(@S,D,P,C):- link(@S,D,C),p=f_init(S,D).
p2 path(@S,D,P,C):- link(@S,Z,C1), path(@Z,D,P2,C2),C=C1+C2,
P=f_concatPath(Z,P2), f_inPath(P2,S)=false.
p3 bestPathCost(@S,D,min<C>):-path(@S,D,P,C).
p4 bestPath(@S,D,P,C):- bestPathCost(@S,D,C), path(@S,D,P,C).
Query bestPath(@S,D,P,C).
The program takes as input link(@S,D,C) tuples, where each tuple corre-
sponds to a copy of an entry in the neighbor table, and represents an edge from
the node itself (S) to one of its neighbors (D) of cost c. NDlog supports a location
specifier in each predicate, expressed with @ symbol followed by an attribute.
This attribute is used to denote the source location of each corresponding tuple.
For example, link tuples are stored based on the value of the S field.
Rules p1-p2 recursively derive path(@S,D,P,C) tuples, where each tuple rep-
resents the fact that the path from S to D is via the path P with a cost of C. Rule
p1 computes one-hop reachability trivially given the neighbor set of S stored in
link(@S,D,C). Rule P2 computes transitive reachability as follows: if there exists
a link from S to Z with cost C1, and Z knows about a shortest path P2 to D
with cost C2, then transitively, S can reach D via the path f concatPath(Z,P2)
with cost C1+C2. Note that p1-p2 also utilizes two list manipulation functions to
maintain path vector p: f init(S,D) initializes a path vector with two elements
S and D, while f concatPath(Z,P2) prepends Z to path vector P2.
Rules p3-p4 take as input hop tuples generated by rules p1-p2, and then derive
the hop along the path with the minimal cost for each source/destination pair.
The output of the program is the set of bestPathHop(@S,D,Z,C) tuples, where
each tuple stores the next hop Z along the shortest path from S to D. To prevent
computing paths with cycles, an extra predicate f inPath(P, S) = false is used
in rule p2, where the function f inPath(P, S) returns true if node S is in the
path vector P.
The execution model of declarative networks is based on a distributed variant
of the standard evaluation technique for Datalog programs that is commonly
known as semi-na¨ıve (SN) evaluation [18], with modifications to enable pipelined
asynchronous evaluation suited to a distributed setting. Reference [18] provides
details on the implementation and execution model of declarative networking.
For the purposes of formal verification, we do not consider the location spec-
ifiers within the proof. This does not affect the program in terms of the set of
eventual facts being generated but does affect the notion of data distribution.
We will revisit this later in Section 7.
3 Overview of DNV
Figure 1 provides an overview of DNV’s basic approach towards unifying speci-
fications, verification, and implementation within a common declarative frame-
work. DNV takes as input NDlog program specifications of the declarative pro-
tocol (see Section 2 for an example). Since most theorem provers leverage type
information, DNV further includes a Type Schema with the NDlog program spec-
ifications. This is not unlike a database-like schema storing the attribute types
of all network state being used.
In order to carry out the formal verification process, the NDlog programs
and schema information are automatically compiled into formal specifications
Fig. 1. DNV overview block diagram. Arrows denote flow of information.
recognizable by a standard theorem prover (e.g. PVS [21], Coq [3]) using the
axiom generator. As depicted in the left-part of Figure 1, At the same time, the
protocol designer specifies high-level invariant properties of the protocol to be
checked via two mechanisms: invariants can be written directly as theorems into
the theorem prover, or expressed as NDlog rules which are then automatically
translated into theorems using the axiom generator. The first approach increases
the expressiveness of invariant properties, where one can reason with invariants
that can be only expressible in higher order logic. The second approach has
restricted expressiveness based on NDlog’s use of Datalog, but has the added
advantage that the same properties expressed in NDlog can be verified by both
theorem prover and at runtime.
From the perspective of network designers, as depicted in the left part of
Figure 1, they reason about their protocols using the high-level protocol specifi-
cations and invariant properties.The NDlog high-level specifications are directly
executed and also proved within the theorem prover. Any errors detected in the
theorem prover can be corrected by changing the NDlog specifications. Our ini-
tial DNV prototype uses the PVS theorem prover, due to its substantial support
for proof strategies which significantly reduce the time required in the actual
proof process. However, the techniques describe in this paper are agnostic to
other theorem provers. We have also validated some of the verification presented
in this paper using the Coq [3] prover.
To illustrate the verification process, we step through the path-vector proto-
col example, shown in Section 2. For ease of exposition, we defer the treatment
of soft-state derivations and events to Section 4, focusing instead on traditional
hard-state data (with infinite lifetimes) that are valid until explicitly deleted.
3.1 From NDlog rules to PVS Axioms
The first step in DNV involves the automatic generation of PVS formalization
(or axioms) directly from NDlog rules. Based on the proof-theoretic semantics of
Datalog [30], there is a natural and automatic mapping from NDlog rules to PVS
axioms.3 Before showing the actual PVS encoding for the path-vector protocol,
it is informative to understand the proof-theoretic semantics of p1 and p2 as
inference rules used in proof system:
The inference rule p1 expresses the logical statement
∀(S,D, P,C).link(S,D,C) ∧ (P = finit(S,D)) =⇒ path(S,D, P,C)
Rule p2 is slightly more complex as some attribute variables do not appear in
the resulting head. The general technique to express these variables is in terms
of existential quantification. Accordingly, rule p2 expresses the logical statement
that
∀(S,D, P,C).∃(C1, C2, Z, P2).
(link(S,Z,C1) ∧ bestPath(Z,D, P2, C2) ∧ C = C1 + C2 ∧
P = fconcatPath(Z,P2)) =⇒ path(S,D, P,C)
From the above logical statements, DNV generates the following axioms:
path_generate: AXIOM
FORALL (S,D,Z:Node)(C:Metric)(P:Path):
(link(S,D,C) AND P=f_init(S,D)) OR
((EXISTS (P2:Path)(C1,C2:Metric): (link(S,Z,C1) AND bestPath(Z,D,P2,C2)
AND C=C1+C2 AND P=f_concatPath(Z,P2))) =>path(S,D,P,C)
path_close: AXIOM
FORALL (S,D,Z:Node)(C:Metric)(P):path(S,D,P,C)
=>((link(S,D,C) AND P=f_init(S,D)) OR
(EXISTS (Z:Node)(P,P2:Path)(C1,C2:Metric): (link(S,Z,C1) AND
bestPath(Z,D,P2,C2) AND C=C1+C2 AND P=f_concatPath(Z,P2))))
The first path generate axiom is generated in a straightforward manner from
rules p1 and p2, where the logical OR indicates that path facts can be gener-
ated from either rule. The path close axiom indicates that the path tuple is the
smallest set derived by the two rules, ensuring that these axioms automatically
generated in DNV correctly reflected the minimal model of NDlog semantics.
The list manipulation functions f concatPath and f init are predefined from
PVS primitive types. We omit this discussion due to space constraints.
PVS provides inductive definitions that allows the two axioms above to be
written in a more concise and logically equivalent form:
path(S,D,(P: Path),C): INDUCTIVE bool =
(link(S,D,C) AND P=f_init(S,D) AND Z=D) OR
(EXISTS (C1,C2:Metric) (Z2:Node) (P2:Path):
link(S,Z,C1) AND path(Z,D,P2,C2) AND C=C1+C2
AND P=f_concatPath(S,P2) AND f_inPath(S,P2))
The universal quantifiers over the attributes to path (i.e. S,D,Z...) are im-
plicitly embedding and existential quantifiers such as C1 and C2 are explicitly
3 The equivalence of NDlog’s proof-theoretic semantics and operational semantics
guarantees that DNV is sound in the sense that, the correctness property established
by DNV corresponds precisely to the operational semantics of NDlog execution.
stated. DNV axiom generator always produces this inductive definition, and em-
ploys the axiom form only in the presence of mutual dependencies among the
head predicates which makes PVS inductive definition impossible.
Accordingly, NDlog rules p3-p4 are automatically complied into PVS formal-
ization in a similar way:
bestPathCost(S,D,min_C): INDUCTIVE bool =
(EXISTS (P:Path): path(S,D,P,min_C)) AND
(FORALL (C2:Metric): (EXISTS (P2:Path): path(S,D,P2,C2)) => min_C<=C2)
bestPath(S,D,P,C):INDUCTIVE bool =
bestPathCost(S,D,C) AND path(S,D,P,C)
In addition to the above PVS encoding for NDlog rules, type definitions are
produced automatically from the database schema information. For instance,
given a database schema definition for
link(src:string, dst:string, metric:integer)
the corresponding PVS type declaration is
link:[Node,Node,Metric -> bool]
where Node is declared as a string type and Metric as an integer type.
3.2 Proving Route Optimality
The next step is to establish the actual properties in PVS. Properties are repre-
sented by PVS theorems and serve as the starting points (or proof goals) in the
proof construction process. In this section we illustrate in high level this proof
process by walking through the route optimality property in the path-vector
protocol captured by the following PVS theorem bestPathStrong:
bestPathStrong: THEOREM
FORALL (S,D:Node) (C:Metric) (P:Path):
bestPath(S,D,P,C) =>
NOT (EXISTS (C2:Metric)(Z:Node)(P2:Path): path(S,D,Z,P2,C2) AND C2<C)
bestPathStrong specifies the following logic formula
∀(S,D,C, P ).bestPath(S,D, P,C) =⇒
¬(∃C2, Z, P2.path(S,D,Z, P2, C2) ∧ (C2 < C))
that a given tuple bestPath(S,D,P,C) implies that there does not exist another
path from S to D with better metrics. This formula therefore represents the fact
that the derived tuple bestPath(S,D,P,C) must correctly denote the optimal path
P from S to D, by excluding the existence of a different better path from S to D
with lower cost.
Given this above theorem, DNV utilizes PVS to carry out the interactive
proof process.
3.3 Interactive Proof Process
In any general purpose theorem prover like PVS, one performs the proof in a goal-
directed fashion interactively by supplying proof commands. In this case, starting
from the bestPathStrong goal, and then recursively reducing it to subgoals until
all subgoals are trivially true.
To automate proof development, PVS has approximately 100 built-in proof
strategies, of which 20 are usually sufficient to automate a majority of the proof
effort. While using a theorem prover is an acquired skill, there are a few general
“rules of thumb” that one can utilize as part of the proof process. We will describe
in detail these rules in Appendix A.
In the remaining of this section, we provide an intuition on the proof process,
by presenting the strawman proof process that does not utilize any user-defined
proof strategies specific to declarative network beyond PVS’s built-in proof com-
mands:
("" (skosimp*) (expand bestPath) (prop) (expand bestPathCost)
(prop) (skosimp*) (inst -2 C2!1) (grind))
This proof script reflects the interactive PVS proof process directed by the
user, where PVS takes care of all low level proof details and allows the user
to concentrate on high-level proof strategies. Without going into details of each
PVS command, we provide a high-level intuition of each step. The first com-
mand skosimp* performs repeated skolemization that removes universal quanti-
fiers S,D,C and P in the theorem. Skolemization is generally the first proof step
to try in proving any universal quantified theorems. The subsequent two expand
commands are used to unfold the inductive definition we defined in 3.1, each
followed by prop that performs proportional simplification. Then skosimp* is
employed to remove universal quantifiers and inst to instantiate the existential
quantified variable with proper instance (C2!1). The rest of the proof is complete
by using PVS’s grind command which performs skolemization, heuristic instan-
tiation, propositional simplification and decision procedures for linear arithmetic
and equality.
Once the above proof script is supplied, PVS requires only fraction of a sec-
ond to carry out and automatically check the actual proof. Note that the proof
covers all instances of the network. This is in contrast to model checking, which
explores only specific network instances. In addition to proving the route opti-
mality property of the declarative path-vector protocol, we have proven proper-
ties such as the potential cycles in the protocol if the cycle check (enforced using
the f inPath function) is removed.
Given that our target users are network designers, the proof process should
ideally be automated. Beyond the general proof methodology presented in Ap-
pendix A that provides a starting point for users, PVS provides mechanisms to
express high-level proof strategies via its proof strategy language that enables
domain-specific knowledge to be exploited and installed in the proof. In Sec-
tion 7, as our future work, we will discuss the potential of using domain-specific
PVS strategies tailored to declarative networking to support proof automation,
as well as survey recent work on automated provers that are potentially useful
for further automating the search process.
4 Soft-state, Events and Dynamics
Up to this point, we have limited our proofs to a subset of the complete NDlog
language by omitting the treatment of soft-state tuples (i.e. predicates). This
simplification enable us to generate axioms recognizable by a theorem prover
directly from NDlog programs without having to worry about the semantics of
time and data expiration. In practice, soft-state data and events are central in
network protocols, and adopted in many declarative network implementations.
In the rest of this section, we will introduce the soft-state model in declarative
networking, describe how rules with soft-state predicates (referred as soft-state
rules) can be verified in a similar fashion as shown in Section 3, by first rewriting
soft-state rules into logically equivalent rules with only hard-state predicates
(i.e.hard-state rules).
4.1 Soft-state Model in DNV
Declarative networking incorporates support for soft-state [26] derivations com-
monly used in networks. In the soft state storage model, all data (input and
derivations) has an explicit “time to live” (TTL) or lifetime, and all tuples must
be explicitly reinserted with their latest values and a new TTL or they are
deleted.
To support soft-state, an additional language feature is added to the NDlog
language, in the form of a materialize [19] declaration at the beginning of each
NDlog program that specifies the TTL of predicates. For example, the expression
materialized(link,10,keys(1,2)) specifies that the link tuple is stored at a table
with primary key set to the first and second attributes (denoted by keys(1,2)
and that each link tuple has a lifetime of 10 seconds4. If the TTL is set to
infinity, the predicate will be treated as hard-state.
The soft-state storage semantics are as follows. When a tuple is derived,
if there exists another tuple with the same primary key but differs on other
attributes, an update occurs, in which the new tuple replaces the previous one.
On the other hand, if the two tuples are identical, a refresh occurs, in which the
existing tuple is extended by its TTL.
For a given predicate, in the absence of any materialize declaration, it is
treated as an event predicate with lifetime set to zero. Since events are not
stored, they are primarily used to trigger other rules or in response to network
events. Reference [17] provides more details on how soft-state storage model and
events are implemented within a declarative networking engine.
4.2 Soft-state to Hard-state Rewrite
The rule rewrite consists of two steps. First, all soft-state predicates of the
form p(...) where “...” refer to predicate arguments, are translated into an
equivalent hard-state predicate of the form p(...,Tc,Tl), where the additional
4 Following the conventions of the P2 declarative networking system, attribute 0 is
reserved for the predicate name.
attributes Tc and Tl denote the creation time and lifetime of each tuple p re-
spectively. This initial rewrite step makes explicit the creation time and lifetime
by adopting Tc, Tl in each soft-state predicate. Event predicates are rewritten
in a similar fashion. However, Tl is omitted since events have zero lifetime by
definition.
After the first step, additional constraints reflecting soft-state semantics are
added to ensure that all soft-state facts only process with other facts valid within
the same window period of time, as expressed in terms of constraints over Tc and
Tl. Consider soft-state rules of the form, e : −e1, s1, s2, ..., sn. This rule triggered
by input event e1 with creation time Tce1, takes as input both the triggering
event and several soft-state predicates s1, s2, ..., sn, and generates a event. The
rewritten equivalent hard-state rules is of the form:
e(..., T ce1) : − e1(..., T ce1), s1(..., T cs1, T ls1),
s2(..., T cs2, T ls2), ...,
sn(..., T csn, T lsn),
T cs1 < Tce1 ≤ Tcs1 + T ls1, ...,
T csn < Tce1 ≤ Tcsn + T lsn
Since the event e1 directly triggers the derivation of s(or e), the creation time
of the derived event e is set to be the same as that of the input e1 (i.e. Tce1).
An additional n constraints Tcsi < Tce1 ≤ Tcsi + T lsi are added to ensure that
only soft-states si with valid time interval [Tcsi, T csi+T lsi] that always overlaps
with Tce1 are used to generate e.
Another possible class of soft-state rules are of the form, e : −s1, s2, ..., sn,
where a event is generated by sets of soft-states. The main difference compared
to the previous soft-state rule is the lack of a triggering event. The rewritten
hard-state rule is of the form:
e(..., T c) : − s1(..., T cs1, T ls1), s2(..., T cs2, T ls2),
..., sn(..., T csn, T lsn),
T c = max < Tcs1, T cs2, ..., T csn >,
Tcs1 < Tc ≤ Tcs1 + tls1, ...,
T csn < Tc ≤ Tcsn + T lsn
Note that Tc is set to the max of all possible creation times of the input
soft-state predicates (since the derived fact is true only when all the input facts
are present).
The same rewrite process applies to rules with rule-head that is a soft-state
predicate., and an additional Tl attribute set to the declared lifetime in corre-
sponding table (indicated in the materialize statement) is added.
4.3 Neighbor-Maintenance
We provide a concrete example of a simple soft-state program that implements
periodic neighbor maintenance, where each node periodically sends a keep-alive
message pingMsg to its neighbors, and then remove the neighbor when a response
pongMsg is not received after a period of time.
materialize(link,10,keys(1,2)).
pp1 pingMsg(S,@D) :- periodic(@S,5), link(@S,D,C).
pp2 pongMsg(@S,D) :- pingMsg(S,@D),link(@D,S,C).
pp3 link(@S,D,C) :- pongMsg(@S,D), C=1.
The program utilizes soft-state predicate link with a TTL of 10 seconds.
In the absence of any materialize declarations, predicates such as pingMsg and
pongMsg are treated as events with zero lifetimes. Rule pp1 is triggered by a
special built-in periodic predicate, which denotes an infinite stream of periodic
event tuples generated at node S every 5 seconds. This allows rule pp1 to generate
a pingMsg every five seconds to all neighbors D. Each neighbor D that receives
the pingMsg replies with a pongMsg (rule pp2), which then results in refreshing
link(@S,D,C). Note that the cost of each link is trivially set to 1 in the earlier
program, although one can also introduce other link metrics, such as round-trip-
time or bandwidth, computed via additional NDlog rules. Given that the lifetime
of each link(@S,D,C) tuple is set to 10 seconds, in the absence of a pingMsg reply
from neighbor D, the corresponding link(@S,D,C) entry will be deleted (upon
expiration).
The resulting hard-state program after applying the rewrite in Section 4.2:
hpp1 pingMsg(S,@D,Tc):- periodic_ping(@S,5,Tc), link(@S,D,C,Tc’,10),
Tc’<Tc<Tc’+10.
hpp2 pongMsg(@S,D,Tc):- pingMsg(S,@D,Tc), link(@D,S,C,Tc’,10),
Tc’<Tc<Tc’+10.
hpp3 link(@S,D,C,Tc,10):- pongMsg(@S,D,Tc),C=1.
hpp4 periodic_ping(@S,5,Tc’):- periodic_ping(@S,5,Tc), Tc’=Tc+5.
All predicates in the above program are materialized as hard-state (TTL=∞),
as we omit the materialize statements for brevity. Since the lifetime of link is
specified as 10 seconds, the last attribute Tl of link after the rewrite is set to
10. An additional rule hpp4 shown above is added to explicitly specify the use of
built-in periodic predicate with interval of 5 seconds. Our rewrite emulates the
behavior of the original NDlog periodic predicate by generating a periodic ping
event every 5 seconds.
5 Distance-vector in a Dynamic Network
In this section, we illustrate the capability of DNV in reasoning about eventual
semantics of protocols in dynamic networks. We base our illustration on the ver-
ification of the distance-vector protocol, commonly used for computing shortest
routes in a network. Due to space constraints, we are not able to show exhaus-
tively all the PVS specifications and proofs. The interested reader is referred to
reference [6] for the complete PVS axioms, theorems, and proofs. In particular,
the proofs are available for replay within PVS, given the axioms and theorems
as input.
5.1 Distance Vector Specification in NDlog
The following soft-state NDlog program implements the distance-vector protocol,
computing best paths with least cost:
materialize(hop,10,keys(1,2,3)).
materialize(bestHop,10,keys(1,2)).
materialize(bestHopCost,10,keys(1,2)).
#include(pp1,pp2,pp3)
dv1 hop(@S,D,D,C) :- link(@S,D,C).
dv2 hop(@S,D,Z,C) :- hopMsg(@S,D,Z,C).
dv3 bestHopCost(@S,D,min<C>) :- hop(@S,D,Z,C).
dv4 bestHop(@S,D,Z,C) :- bestHopCost(@S,D,C), hop(@S,D,Z,C).
dv5 hopMsg(@N,D,S,C1+C2):- periodic(@S,5), bestHop(@S,D,Z,C1),
link(@S,N,C2).
Query bestHop(@S,D,Z,C)
The #include declaration in first line introduces into distance-vector protocol
the rules pp1-pp3 from the Ping-Pong program in the previous section for main-
taining neighbor information as links. The program derives soft-state predicates
hop, bestHop, and bestHopCost with TTL of 10 seconds, and an event predicate
hopMsg, and takes as input link tuples generated from rules pp1-pp3.
First, rules dv1-dv2 derive hop(@S,D,Z,C) tuples, where Z denotes the next
hop (instead of the entire path) along the path from S to D. Second, the protocol
is driven by the periodic generation of hopMsg(@S,D,Z,C) in rule dv5, where each
node S advertises its knowledge of all possible best hops table (bestHop) to all
its neighbors. Note that bidirectional connectivity and cost is assumed. Each
node receives the advertisements as hopMsg events (rule dv2) which it then stores
locally in its hop table. Finally, Rules dv3-dv4 compute the best hop for each
source/destination pair in a similar fashion as the earlier path-vector protocol.
Unlike the path-vector protocol presented in Section 2.2, the distance-vector
protocol computes only the next hop along the best path, and hence does not
store the entire path between any two nodes.
5.2 Axiom Generation for Soft-State
The following NDlog rules dv1-dv6 shows the equivalent hard-state rules after
applying the soft-state rewrite process described in Section 4.2.
#include(hpp1,hpp2,hpp3,hpp4)
dv1 hop(@S,D,D,C,Tc,10):- link(@S,D,C,Tc,10).
dv2 hop(@S,D,Z,C,Tc,10):- hopMsg(@Z,D,W,C2,Tc2), Tc=Tc2+5, C=C2+1.
dv3 bestHopCost(@S,D,min<C>,Tc,10):- hop(@S,D,D,C,Tc,10).
dv4 bestHop(@S,D,Z,C,Tc,10):- bestHopCost(@S,D,C,Tc,10),
hop(@S,D,Z,C,Tc1,10), Tc1<Tc<=Tc1+10.
dv5 hopMsg(@N,D,Z,C,Tc):- periodic_dv(@S,5,Tc), bestHop(@S,D,Z,C,Tc1,10),
link(@S,N,C,Tc2,10),Tc2<Tc<=Tc2+10,
Tc1<Tc<=Tc1+10.
dv6 periodic_dv(@S,5,Tc):- periodic_dv(@S,5,Tc2), Tc=Tc2+5
Query bestHop(@S,D,Z,C,Tc,Tl)
Rules dv1-dv5 are the corresponding hard-state rewrites, and dv6 emulates
the behavior of periodic streams employed in dv5, as described in Section 4.2. We
introduce an extra constraint Tc=Tc2+5 in rule dv2. This condition is required so
that causality of rule execution is preserved within one interval: resulting hopMsg
events generated within one periodic interval derives hop facts used in the next
period internal and not vice versa. We note that this addition constraint is
automatically added: required only in cases when rules depend on each other in
a cyclical fashion (e.g. hop derived in dv1-dv2, hopMsg in dv5, and bestHop in dv4),
a dependency that can be detected via static check.
Based on this rewritten program, the automatically generated PVS axioms
are as follows:
hopMsg(S,D,Z,C,Tc): INDUCTIVE bool =
(EXISTS (Tc2,T3:Time):
bestHop(S,D,Z,C,Tc2,10) AND periodic(S,5,Tc) AND
link(S,D,Tc3,10) AND Tc2<Tc<=Tc2+10 AND Tc3<Tc<=Tc3+10 AND C=1)
hop(S,D,Z,C,Tc,Tl): INDUCTIVE bool =
(link(S,D,Tc,10) AND Z=D AND Tl=10 AND C=1) OR
(EXISTS (C2:Metric):
hopMsg(S,D,Z,C2,Tc2) AND C=C2+1 AND Tl=10 AND Tc=Tc2+5)
bestHopCost(S,D,MIN_C,Tc,Tl): INDUCTIVE bool =
EXISTS (Z:Node):
hop(S,D,Z,MIN_C,Tc) AND Tl=10 AND
(FORALL (C:Metric): (EXISTS (Z:Node): hop(S,D,Z,C,Tc,10))=>MIN_C<=C)
bestHop_refresh: AXIOM
FORALL (S,D,Z:Node) (C:Metric) (Tc:Time):
(bestHopCost(S,D,C,Tc,10) AND hop(S,D,Z,C,Tc,10))
=>bestHop(S,D,Z,C,Tc,10)
bestHop_close: AXIOM
FORALL (S,D,Z:Node) (C:Metric) (Tc:Time):
bestHop(S,D,Z,C,Tc,10) =>
(bestHopCost(S,D,C,Tc,10) AND hop(S,D,Z,C,Tc,10))
periodic_dv(S,I,Tc): INDUCTIVE bool =
EXISTS (Tc2:Time): periodic_dv(S,I,Tc2) AND Tc=Tc2+5 AND I=5
Recall automatic axiom generation process in Section 3.1, PVS axioms would
be explicitly used in face of mutual dependencies between rules (that derive
bestHop, hop, and hopMsg). To break the dependency, we therefore specify dv4
with two axioms bestHop refresh and bestHop close .
5.3 Convergence in Stable Network
The lack of knowledge of the entire path in the distance-vector protocol comes
at the expense of potential update loops in the presence of link updates. This
is a well-known limitation of the distance-vector protocol, commonly known as
the count-to-infinity problem.
Fig. 2. Network Dynamics
Our verification is performed on a 4-node network instance as shown in Fig-
ure 2(a). Note that this instance represents a loop consisting of three nodes
(a, b, and c) that can reach the rest part of the network via a fourth node d,
and the results of this verification apply to arbitrary network that contains such
a loop. For ease of exposition and avoid redoing the proof established for the
Ping-Pong program in Section 4 on neighbor maintenance, we supply this net-
work instance using the following PVS inductive definition, where each clause
connected by logical operator OR represents a link between two nodes:
link(S,D,C,Tc,Tl): INDUCTIVE bool =
(S=a AND D=b AND C=1 AND Tl=10 AND
(EXISTS (i:posnat): Tc=5*i))
OR (S=b AND D=c AND C=1 AND Tl=10 AND
(EXISTS (i:posnat): Tc=5*i))
OR ...
(S=a AND D=d AND C=1 AND Tl=10 AND
(EXISTS (i:posnat): Tc=5*i))
Network convergence is expressed using the following theorem:
bestHopCost_converge: THEOREM
EXISTS (j:posnat): FORALL (S,D:Node)
(C:Metric)(i:posnat): (i>j)
=> bestHopCost(S,D,C,5*i,10) = bestHopCost(S,D,C,5*j,10)
Given an input network, the distance-vector protocol requires a number of
rounds of communication among all nodes, for route advertisements (in the form
of hopMsg) to be propagated in the network. In the above theorem, the existential
quantified variable j denotes the initial number of periodic intervals (set to be at
least the network diameter) required to propagate all route advertisements. The
theorem states that for any arbitrary time i after j, the value of bestHopCost
always converges (i.e. no longer changes).
5.4 Count-to-Infinity Analysis
Next, we demonstrate the capability of DNV to prove the presence of the count-
to-infinity problem in the distance-vector protocol. This is a well-studied limita-
tion where the protocol potentially diverges (i.e. not reach steady state) in the
presence of link failures.
Before showing the actual proofs, we provide a textbook example [23] that
clearly demonstrates the problem intuitively. Revisiting the network in Fig-
ure 2(b), when link(a,d) fails, node a would advertises this information to its
immediate neighbors b and c. However, despite the fact that d is no longer reach-
able from either a b or c, based on information that c can reach d in two hops,
b would conclude that it can reach d in three hops. Node c makes a similar
conclusion. In the next round of updates, node a learns that b and c can reach
d in three hops, and updates its distance to d as four accordingly. This cycle
continues indefinitely, resulting in the count-to-infinity problem.
Proving Divergence The proof requires a network scenario that results in a
count-to-infinity problem. Using the example described above, we supply this
network dynamics using the following PVS inductive definition:
link (S,D,C,Tc): INDUCTIVE bool =
(S=a AND D=b AND C=1 AND
(EXISTS (i:posnat): Tc=5*i) AND Tc<100)
OR (S=b AND D=a AND C=1 AND
(EXISTS (i:posnat): Tc=5*i) AND Tc<100)
OR ...
(S=a AND D=d AND C=1 AND
(EXISTS (i:posnat): Tc=5*i) AND Tc<100)
OR (S=d AND D=a AND C=1 AND
(EXISTS (i:posnat): Tc=5*i) AND Tc<100)
OR (S=a AND D=b AND C=1 AND
(EXISTS (i:posnat): Tc=5*i) AND Tc>=100)
OR (S=b AND D=a AND C=1 AND
(EXISTS (i:posnat): Tc=5*i) AND Tc>=100)
OR ...
(S=c AND D=b AND C=1 AND
(EXISTS (i:posnat): Tc=5*i) AND Tc>=100)
OR (S=b AND D=c AND C=1 AND
(EXISTS (i:posnat): Tc=5*i) AND Tc>=100)
The definition indicates that the link(a,d) and link(d,a) facts are only
present before time 100, denoting that a link failure between nodes a and d
happens at time 100. The count-to-infinity theorem is expressed as follows:
bestHop_increase_to_infinity: THEOREM
FORALL (a,b,d:Node)(t:Time)(c:Metric):
(t>100 AND bestHop(a,d,b,c,t,10))
=> (EXISTS (t’:Time)(c’:Metric):
(t’>t AND c’>c AND bestHop(a,d,b,c’,t’,10)))
The theorem above states that if the distance vector protocol diverges, the
best hop from a to d will increase indefinitely over time, a symptom of the
count-to-infinity problem. In reference [6], we have the complete proof of this
theorem, as well as addition theorems that further verify the presence of the
count-to-infinity problem.
Interestingly, we have been able to prove in PVS a set of stronger theorems
specific to this three-node network cycle, stating that the cost of the bestPath
between both b and d, as well as those between a and d would increase following
a precise pattern, as expressed in the following PVS theorems:
bestHop_bd_increase_to_infinity: THEOREM
FORALL (t: Time) (c: Metrics):
(EXISTS (i:posnat): t=i*5 and t>100)
=> (bestHop(b,d,a,c,t,10) => bestHop(b,d,a,c+2,t+10,10))
bestHop_ad_increase_to_infinity: THEOREM
FORALL (t:Time) (c:Cost):
(EXISTS (i:posnat): t=i*5 and t>100)
=> (bestHop (a,d,b,c,t,10) => bestHop(a,d,b,c+2,t+10,10))
These theorems predict precisely that the value of cost argument increases by
2 at every two update intervals of 10 seconds. Since node b and c are symmetric
in the loop, the same set of theorems apply to c.
Split Horizon Solution Split-horizon is a well-known solution to the count-to-
infinity problem. Interestingly, the changes to the NDlog specification to imple-
ment the split-horizon solution is minimal, requiring only adding one additional
selection predicate to rule dv5, hence further demonstrating the power of declara-
tive programming. The modified rule dv5 is appended by the additional predicate
N!=Z as:
dv5 hopMsg(@N,D,Z,C,Tc):- periodic(@S,5,Tc), bestHop(@S,D,Z,C,Tc1,10),
link(@S,N,C,Tc2,10), Tc2<Tc<=Tc2+10,
Tc1<Tc<=Tc1+10, N!=Z.
Rule dv5 expresses that if node Z learns about the path to D from node N ,
then node Z does not report this path back to to N.
One of the well-known limitations of the split-horizon fix is that it is limited
to only solving the count-to-infinity problem in the cases where there are two-
node cycles. Using DNV, we have successfully verified this limitation in the case
where there are three-node cycles [6]. In the rest of this section, we outline our
proofs that demonstrate that this fix indeed works for a two-node cycle.
Consider the network with two-node loop of a,b as depicted in Figure 2(c),
the invariant stating that split horizon prevents counting-to-infinity in face of
link failure works for two-node-loop is expressed as theorems:
bestHop_ac: Theorem
FORALL (t: Time):
t>= 110 AND (EXISTS (i: posnat): t=5*i)
=> NOT (EXISTS (z: Node) (C: Cost): bestHop (a,c,z,C,t,10))
bestHop_bc: Theorem
FORALL (t: Time):
t>= 110 AND (EXISTS (i: posnat): t=5*i)
=> NOT (EXISTS (z: Node) (C: Cost): bestHop (b,c,z,C,t,10))
These theorems states that the link failure in Figure 2(d) would be correctly
reflected in the computation of bestHop: as long as node c is no longer reachable
due to the link failure, bestHop between c and rest of the loop (i.e. node a, b)
can no longer be derived. Our results generalizes to any network involving this
two-node topology, and therefore we actually showed that in general, by applying
split-horizon, distance vector protocol can prevent count-to-infinity problem we
have seen in Section 5.4.
Furthermore we prove that split horizon works only in networks containing
loops of two nodes, and counting-to-infinity cannot be avoided in loops involving
three nodes. The fact split horizon fails to prevent counting-to-infinity when link
fails, in a three-node-loop in Figure 2(a) is captured by the following set of PVS
theorems:
bestHop_ae_increase_to_infinity: THEOREM
FORALL (t:Time) (c:Cost):
(EXISTS (i:posnat): t=i*5 and t>100)
=> (bestHop (a,e,b,c,t,10) => bestHop(a,e,b,c+3,t+15,10))
bestHop_bea_increase_to_infinity: THEOREM
FORALL (t: Time) (c: Cost):
(EXISTS (i:posnat): t=i*5 and t>100)
=> (bestHop(b,e,a,c,t,10) => bestHop(b,e,a,c+3,t+15))
bestHop_bec_increase_to_infinity: THEOREM
FORALL (t: Time) (c: Cost):
(EXISTS (i:posnat): t=i*5 and t>100)
=> (bestHop(b,e,c,c,t,10) => bestHop(b,e,c,c+3,t+15,10))
Note that again, these theorems not only state the fact that count-to-infinity
occurs, but also explicitly predict the precise increasing pattern. In establishing
the theorems here, PVS with its automatic and enforced proof checking mecha-
nism manifests its value in verifying complicated properties that is not obvious
from intuition: we did not discover a minor but critical error in the increasing
pattern derived on paper and pencil until the use of PVS. Indeed, the mechanical
PVS proofs allows DNV verification results to be replayed and checked by any
third party. These three theorems is proved via a set of intermediate theorems
(i.e. lemmas), displayed as follows:
bestHop_ce_exist: Theorem
FORALL (T: Time) (C: Cost):
T>110 AND (EXISTS (i: posnat): T=i*5) AND
bestHop(a,e,b,C,T-5,10) AND bestHop(a,e,c,C,T-5,10) AND
(FORALL (z: Node) (c: Cost):
NOT (bestHop(b,e,z,c,T-5,10) OR (bestHop(c,e,z,c,T-5,10))))
=> bestHop(c,e,a,C+1,T,10)
bestHop_ce_exist2: Theorem
FORALL (T: Time) (C: Cost):
T>110 AND (EXISTS (i: posnat): T=i*5) AND
bestHop(c,e,a,C,T-5,10) AND bestHop(b,e,a,C,T-5,10) AND
(FORALL (z: Node) (c: Cost): NOT bestHop(a,e,z,c,T-5,10))
=> bestHop(c,e,b,C+1,T,10)
bestHop_ae_t: Theorem
FORALL (T: Time) (C: Cost):
T>110 AND (EXISTS (i: posnat): T=i*5) AND
bestHop(b,e,c,C,T-5,10) AND bestHop(c,e,b,C,T-5,10)
=> bestHop(a,e,c,C+1,T,10)
Note that these results derived on a specific instance, can be generalized to
arbitrary network that contains a subnetwork has the topology in Figure 2(a).
A complete list of mechanically checked proof can be found at [6].
6 Related Work
We briefly survey existing work on network protocol verification.
Classical theorem proving has been used in the past few decades for verifi-
cation of network protocols [29, 5, 10, 4]. Despite extensive work, this approach
is generally restricted to protocol design and standards, and cannot be directly
applied to protocol implementation. A high initial investment based on domain
expert knowledge is often required to develop the system specifications accept-
able by some theorem prover (up to several man-months). Therefore, even after
successful proofs in the theorem prover, the actual implementation is not guar-
anteed to be error-free. DNV avoids this problem by using a common executable
declarative networking language that can be directly verified in a theorem prover.
Runtime verification techniques (e.g. [15, 16, 27]) is a mechanism for checking
at runtime that a system does not violate expected properties. Since declarative
networks utilize a distributed query engine to execute its protocols, these checks
can be expressed as monitoring queries in NDlog. However, any runtime veri-
fication scheme will incur additional runtime overheads, and subtle bugs may
require a long time to be encountered. Moreover, the properties can be checked
in this case are restricted to those can be expressed in NDlog. In particular,
any universal quantified properties, such as bestPathStrong we demonstrated in
Section 3.2 is not checkable in runtime verification based on NDlog query engine.
Model checking is a collection of algorithmic techniques for checking temporal
properties of system instances based on exhaustive state space exploration. Re-
cent significant advances in model checking network protocol implementations
include MaceMC [13] and CMC [7]. Compared to DNV, these approaches are
sound as well, but not complete in the sense that the large state space persistent
in network protocols often prevents complete exploration of the huge system
states. While the heuristics used in exploration maximize the chances of detect-
ing property violations, they are typically inconclusive and restricted to small
network instances and temporal properties.
By adopting a theorem-proving based approach in this paper, DNV is more
expressive and flexible compared to MaceMC and CMC, since higher-order log-
ics can be used to specify network properties. In addition, since DNV directly
verifies declarative networking specifications, an explicit model extraction step
via execution exploration is not required.
7 Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we present DNV, a declarative network verifier that utilizes the-
orem proving to establish properties of declarative networking protocols. DNV
addresses a practical problem in the networking domain: the ability to specify,
execute and verify a network protocol within a unified language and system. DNV
achieves this via the use of a declarative language, that can not only be used to
execute network protocols, but provide a natural mapping to logical axioms for
validating protocol correctness within a general purpose theorem prover. Using
the PVS theorem prover, we validate the use of DNV to prove properties of
various declarative routing protocols. To our best knowledge, DNV is one of the
first attempts at using theorem proving to verify system implementation and
eventual semantics of protocols with soft-state properties in dynamic networks.
We are in the process of applying DNV to more complex overlay networks,
and reasoning about routing protocols, particularly when integrated with poli-
cies [11, 9]. Our initial experiences suggest that DNV is a promising approach
towards a unified framework that integrates specification, implementation, and
verification. Moving forward, we have identified a few areas of future work.
First, most general-purpose theorem provers utilize an interactive proof pro-
cess that requires experience of these provers. We are currently exploring ways in
which one can automate the proof construction by using domain-specific proof
strategies that users can develop with the PVS proof strategy language [22, 2],
hence lowering the barrier for adoption by network designers. In Appendix A,
we outline the general proof strategies that we have used for all the proofs
presented in this paper. Our general rules of thumb in proving these theorems
suggests that an automated proof construction process is attainable. However,
more work needs to be done to validate this possibility.
Second, recent work on boolean satisfiability (SAT) solving and satisfiability
modulo theories (SMT) [33, 34], as well as the development in automated first-
order theorem provers [28] have enable fully automated theorem proving based
approaches to software and hardware verification. This provides an alternative
proof automation support to PVS proof strategies developments that we plan to
incorporate into DNV.
Third, we have limited our proofs to a subset of the complete NDlog lan-
guage, omitting the treatment of location specifiers for distribution. We conjec-
ture that in the presence of reliable in-order communication channels, handling
of location specifiers does not require radically different treatment since they
affect distributed evaluation of NDlog programs but not NDlog semantics per se.
Interestingly, the prevalent use of soft-state and periodic refreshes in NDlog pro-
grams provides a natural mechanism for ensuring eventually correct semantics
in the face of reordered messages, node disconnection, and other unpredictable
occurrences that are common in distributed systems.
Finally, despite the lack of completeness in MaceMC and CMC, there are
situations when model-checking based techniques are useful for facilitating proof
automation in theorem proving. We intend to explore combining model checking
and theorem proving in the following way: (1) model-checking a abstract scaled-
down finite-state instance (2) generalize the scaled-down instance to the original
problem by theorem proving, and (3) justify in the theorem prover that the
correctness of the downscaled system established by model checking implies the
correctness of the original full-blown system. This approach has proven successful
in a variety of industrial-strength protocol verification experiments [12]. We plan
to leverage PVS’s support for CTL (variant of temporal logic) model-checking
[21] to integrate model checking into DNV.
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A Interactive Theorem Proving
In this appendix, we present a set of proof methodologies that are aimed towards
aiding a non theorem-proving expert on the proof process, as long she/he has
basic knowledge of standard proof techniques used in logic and mathematics. The
proof methodologies presented also lays the groundwork for future automation
in the proof process.
We present the proof methodologies from the perspective of PVS, which is the
theorem prover adopted by DNV. While the terminologies are specific to PVS,
the general techniques are agnostic, and hence applicable to any general purpose
theorem prover. For instance, the proof methodologies used in the Coq [3] the-
orem prover are similar, when used for proving the network protocols presented
in this paper.
In the rest of this section, we first present the general methodology in Sec-
tion A.1, followed by a specific example in Section A.2 based on a theorem
presented and proven in this paper.
A.1 PVS Proving Guide
The proof objective in PVS is to develop a proof tree where all leaves are true.
Accordingly PVS proof development is carried out in a goal-directed style where
user starts from the proof goal, and applies PVS command recursively to reduce
proof root to subgoals that are trivially true. Each node in the proof tree repre-
sents a intermediate logic sequent derived from the proof root. A sequent of the
form
{−1} A1 · · ·
{−m} Am
`
{1} C1 · · ·
{n} Cn
is interpreted as (A1 ∧ · · · ∧Am) =⇒ (C1 ∨ · · ·Cn), i.e. the conjunction of the
set of antecedents A1 · · ·Am implies the disjunction of consequences C1 · · ·Cn.
In the language of sequent calculus, the proof task is then to reduce the sequent
into one of the following forms: (1) one of the antecedents is false or (2) one of
consequences is true or (3) one of the antecedents is logically equivalent to one
of the consequences.
PVS Build-in Commands One distinguished feature of PVS is its signif-
icantly larger deduction steps (hence simplifier proof development) compared
with other popular proof assistants. This is largely due to PVS’s build-in tools
for automating portions of the proof process. PVS provides two levels of proof
commands to aid user-derived proof development: (1) high-level proof strategies
or decision procedure that take care of tedious and repeated proof patterns and
(2) low-level commands that enables user finer control when built-in heuristic
alone does not completely discharge the proof goal.
In principle, it is always good and safe to try the high-level and fully au-
tomated proof strategies first. Such proof strategy either completely discharges
the goal or reduce the goal to a more manageable form by performing certain
simplification. 5
The following build-in proof strategies are typically the first to be attempted:
• skosimp*, skolem! and inst, for manually quantifier proof. The intuitive behind
skosimp*, skolem! is to replace the quantified variable with a fixed arbitrary
constant, followed by repeated simplification, whereas inst instantiates the
existential quantified variable with a proper instance.
5 A subtle issue is that a greedy heuristic (proof strategy) sometimes would reduce a
provable goal to un-provable form. This is because a reduction can be strengthening
(or weakening) both the antecedents and consequences, and may make implication
between antecedents and consequences no longer true. However, one can always
revert to proof status before applying such proof strategy and therefore it is always
safe to try high-level strategy first.
• induct and induct-rule for induction. While induct performs induction on
natural numbers, induct-rule performs induction according to some recursive
definition.
Other most frequently-used high-level strategies for propositional reasoning
include the following:
• expand, grind, ground and prop for non-inductive, definition expansion, arith-
metic, equality, and quantifier reasoning.
General “Rules of Thumb” We have identify the following eight forms of
proof goals that we frequently encounter, as well as providing a solution that
works most of the time in our proof development.
1. Remove universal quantifiers:
{-1} A1 ...
|------
{1} (FORALL x): P(x)...
Try apply (skosimp*) to automatically remove universal quantified variable
x by replacing x with fixed and arbitrary skolem constant. Note that P can
be a very complex compound predicate built from many primitive functions
and predicts over x. A dual-form is existential quantified antecedent :
{-1} (EXISTS x): P(x) ...
|------
{1} C1 ...
Try apply skolem!, which performs a similar standard skolemization over x.
2. Remove implications: if the goal of the form
` (A1 ∧A2 ∧ · · · ∧Am =⇒ (C1 ∨ C2 ∨ · · · ∨ Cn)) as denoted by PVS
sequent:
|------
A1 AND A2 AND Am => (C1 OR C2 OR Cn)
Try apply (prop) to reduce the goal to more the following manageable form
{-1} A1 ...
{-m} Am
|------
{1} C1...
{n} Cn
Furthermore, Since proof of any of the consequents: Ci is sufficient to prove
the goal, one could try (delete 1 ... (i-1) (i+1) ... m) to remove all the
irrelevant consequents Cj , j 6= i, given that the user correctly predict the
truth of such Ci.
3. Unfold user-defined definitions: if the goal does not contain
quantifications as shown in case 1, or implications as shown in case 2, but
contains some user-defined predicate or function P as denoted in the
following form:
|------
{1} P(c)
Then try (expand "1" "P") to unfold the definition of P, and allow the user
to continue proof development by using useful information in the definition
of P.
4. Inductive reasoning: if the goal does not contain quantifications or
implication as in case 1 and 2, but contains some user-defined recursive
definition/function/predicate r as denoted in the following form:
|------
{1} ... r(x) ...
Then try (induct "1" "x") or (induct rule 1 "r") to perform inductive
reasoning. The difference is that induct performs induction over natural
number x whereas induct rule performs induction according to the
recursive generating rule defined by r.
5. Instantiate existential variables: if the goal contains a existential
quantified formula ∃x.P (x) where there exists a constant c which makes
P (c) true, as displayed:
|------
{1} (EXISTS x): P(x)
Then by picking a constant c such that P(x) evaluates to truth, (inst "1"
"c") would solve this goal, and complete this branch of proof tree.
6. Using lemmas and axioms: if all the above proof attempts failed in
reducing or solving the proof, but some established lemma/theorem proved
before or some user-defined axiom can be used to reduce the current goal,
then either (lemma "theorem name") or (use "theorem name") would bring
that lemma/theorem/axiom identified by name theorem name to the
antecedent of the current goal.
7. PVS build-in strategies: whenever one is stuck in the proof, it is
typically useful to attempt one of the standard PVS built-in proof
strategies such as (grind), (assert), (ground), and (prop) to complete the
rest of the proof. While this strategy does not work in all cases, they are
typically useful in getting to the next step in the proof process.
8. Backtracking and postponing: Often times, it is useful to backtrack in
the proof process or defer the current goal to be proven. This is achievable
using the command (undo) which reverts to the previous proof state by
eliminate the effects of last command. Another useful control command is
(postpone) which allows the user to traverse through all the subgoals, by
postpone the proof of the current goal.
A.2 Example: bestPathStrong
Having presented the basic methodology for interactive theorem proving, we
now proceed to demonstrate this methodology using the bestPathStrong
theorem presented in Section 3.2. Recall that we have proven the theorem
bestPathStrong ` ∀(S,D,C, P ).bestPath(S,D, P,C) =⇒
¬(∃C2, Z, P2.path(S,D,Z, P2, C2) ∧ (C2 < C))
Using the actual PVS proof transcripts of bestPathStrong, We illustrate the
interactive proof process by employing the rules we identified above as well as
the significant proof automation support in PVS.
First, when the PVS prover is started, it begins with the original goal to be
proven, i.e. the theorem bestPathStrong as follows:
bestPathStrong :
|-------
{1} FORALL (S, D: Node)(C: Metric)(P: Path):
bestPath(S,D,P,C) =>
NOT (EXISTS (C2:Metric)(Z:Node)(P2:Path):
path(S, D, Z, P2, C2) AND C2 < C)
Rule?
PVS is now ready to prove ` bestPathStrong 6 and prompt Rule? is waiting
for PVS a commands to guide the proof development. Observe that this
universal quantified goal matches the first proof development pattern we
described above, we then try skosimp* to perform Skolemization, and PVS
reduced bestPathStrong to the following for us:
Rule? (skosimp*)
Repeatedly Skolemizing and flattening,
this simplifies to:
bestPathStrong :
{-1} bestPath(S!1, D!1, P!1, C!1)
{-2} path(S!1, D!1, Z!1, P2!1, C2!1)
{-3} C2!1 < C!1
|-------
Recall that if there is no consequent presented, the proof task is to show one of
the antecedent evaluates to false. Therefore, this simplification/reduction says
to prove bestPathStrong it is sufficient to find out some skolem constant S!1,
D!1, P!1, ... such that one of the three antecedent {-1,-2,-3} evaluates to
false. We observed that this is the case of rule 3, and we then try expand to
unfold the definition of bestPath:
Rule?: (expand bestPath)
Expanding the definition of bestPath,
this simplifies to:
bestPathStrong :
{-1} (bestPathCost(S!1,D!1,C!1)) AND
(EXISTS (Z:Node):path(S!1,D!1,Z,P!1,C!1))
[-2] path(S!1,D!1,Z!1,P2!1,C2!1)
[-3] C2!1 < C!1
|-------
We observe some changes in antecedent {-1} and would like PVS to reduce it
to a more readable form. Since it is non-inductive and quantifier free, we try
the propositional simplification strategy prop, and PVS produces the following:
6 PVS starts from sequent with only one consequence bestPathStrong (labeled {1})
and no antecedent, which intuitively means that we are required to prove that
bestPathStrong must be unconditionally true.
Rule?: (prop)
Applying propositional simplification,
this simplifies to:
bestPathStrong :
{-1} (bestPathCost(S!1,D!1,C!1))
{-2} EXISTS (Z: Node): path(S!1,D!1,Z,P!1,C!1)
[-3] path(S!1,D!1,Z!1,P2!1,C2!1)
[-4] C2!1<C!1
|-------
Regarding the 8 rules, we then repeatedly guess and supply following
commands: (expand bestPathCost) (prop) (skosimp*) (inst -2 C2!1)
And finally arrive at the following display
[-1] path(S!1, D!1, Z!2, P!2, C!1)
{-2} (EXISTS (Z2:Node)(P2:Path):
path(S!1,D!1,Z2,P2,C2!1)) => C!1<=C2!1
[-3] path(S!1, D!1, Z!3, P!1, C!1)
[-4] path(S!1, D!1, Z!1, P2!1, C2!1)
[-5] C2!1 < C!1
|-------
At this stage, all user-defined definitions are unfolded, no induction reasoning
is required, and most important of all, we have manually provide instantiation
in (inst -2 C2!1). Therefore, we decide it is time for PVS to try discharge the
goal completely for us, and we try the most greedy high level heuristic grind:
Rule?: (grind)
Trying repeated skolemization, instantiation,
and if-lifting,Q.E.D.
The proof is hence completed.
